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OTTO AND THE COURT
Stephen R. Barnett*
The first time I met Otto Kaus, the topic was bizarre, and per-
haps not suitable for the staid and proper pages of a law review's
memorial tribute. But Otto was never one to keep things serious
and proper, and I don't think he'd have wanted us to bowdlerize
him. So here goes.
It was at a meeting of the American Law Institute in Washing-
ton, D.C., sometime in the mid-1970s. I was not then a California
court junkie and had never heard of Otto Kaus. But somehow,
during a break in (or during) the learned debates on new Restate-
ments and the like, I fell into conversation with this name-tagged
fellow Californian, who turned out to be a court of appeal justice.
I have no memory of how the topic came up-maybe there
was something relevant in a pending Restatement-but we talked
about recovery for loss of consortium. And Otto was telling me,
from his experience as a trial judge, what the testimony was usu-
ally like when the plaintiff spouse was put on the stand and asked
the delicate but unavoidable question: "How often did the two of
you have sex?"
The answer, said Otto, was always "three times a week." As
he explained it, with that clipped Viennese accent and that mis-
chievous light in his eye: "If she said less than three times a week,
it wouldn't sound like so much. If she said more than three times a
week, no jury would believe her. So it's always three times a
week."
That was vintage Otto-irreverent, savvy, slightly risqfie, un-
fooled but charitable toward human foibles, grounded in earthy
truth. Several years later, when I came to know both Otto and his
judicial work, I recalled that I had caught this glimpse of one facet
of a matchless man and judge.
I came to know Otto partly as a neighbor. When he was on
the supreme court and commuting weekends back home to Los
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Angeles, he took as a weeknight pied d terre a room over the ga-
rage-a sort of coachman's quarters-in a Spanish-style estate
near the Claremont Hotel in Berkeley, not far from where I lived.
So we occasionally ran into each other, and once or twice had a
drink, dinner, or a game of tennis (fierce on Otto's part). My total
immersion in Otto, though, came through his supreme court opin-
ions.
Although Otto joined the court on July 21, 1981, the wheels
there grind so creakily that the first majority opinion by Kaus, J.,
didn't appear until December 17, 1981.1 More surprising, Otto's
first dissenting or concurring opinion didn't see light until a month
after that.2 But once Otto got started, like some souped-up BMW,
he went instantly to full speed. Nineteen eighty-two thus proved
to be a fully productive year for the new Justice Kaus, and in ret-
rospect perhaps the most significant of his four years on the court.3
I happened to do a law review article on the work of the California
Supreme Court for 1982,4 so I had the luck of taking a close look
at the opinions produced by Otto during that path-breaking year.
Reading now what I wrote about Otto then, I find it less em-
barrassing than many such confrontations with one's former
authorial self, but I do wish I hadn't been so stiff, constrained, and
cautious. I commended Justice Kaus for "the generally high qual-
ity of his opinions," which were "pragmatic, fact conscious, and
dispassionate."5 I deemed Otto's majority opinions "at once
knowledgeable and readable, even when dealing with rather tech-
nical subjects," but found his "most distinctive" voice in his dis-
sents.6 These were "remarkably concise, often no more than a
1. See People v. Lock, 30 Cal. 3d 454, 637 P.2d 292, 179 Cal. Rptr. 56 (1981).
2. See Assembly v. Deukmejian, 30 Cal. 3d 638, 694, 639 P.2d 939, 973, 180 Cal.
Rptr. 297,331 (1982) (Kaus, J., dissenting).
3. As noted, Otto's first opinion appeared in December 1981. Although Otto
retired on October 16, 1985, he sat as a "holdover" pro tern justice in cases decided
through December 31, 1985. See, e.g., White v. Western Title Ins. Co., 40 Cal. 3d
870, 900, 710 P.2d 309, 327, 221 Cal. Rptr. 509, 527 (1985) (Kaus, J., sitting under as-
signment by chairperson of Judicial Council, concurring and dissenting). Otto's par-
ticipation in decisions of the court thus covered almost exactly the four years of 1982
through 1985.
4. See Stephen R. Barnett, The Supreme Court of California, 1981-1982: Fore-
word: The Emerging Court, 71 CAL. L. REv. 1134 (1983). (The subsequent aban-
donment of this annual "California Supreme Court issue" by the California Law
Review, and the apparent lack of interest on the part of any other California law
journal in picking it up, strike me as emblems of the court's declining reputation-
and its need for someone like Otto.)
5. Id. at 1182
6. Id. at 1183, 1185.
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page long[,]... lucid and... low key, down-to-earth, often witty
and wry.... a contrast to the high-pitched rhetoric that sometimes
emanates from other chambers.,
7
The other regret I have on rereading that piece springs from
its optimistic tone about Otto's role in the court's future. I de-
scribed the court in 1983 as "emerging from a period of transi-
tion,"8 with Otto and three other justices (Allen Broussard, Cruz
Reynoso, and Joseph Grodin) having recently come on board, and
I assumed that the court was in for a period of greater stability.
That assumption has been repeatedly foiled, first by Otto's own
premature departure in 1985, then by the upheaval of the 1986 ju-
dicial election, and since then (it seems) by the siren call of private
judging. While I had little praise in that piece for the 1982 court's
majority ("One of the main strengths of the present court lies in its
dissents," as I delicately put it),9 I implicitly looked forward to an
extended period in which Otto would play a major role on the
court. It's sad to read that now, with the knowledge that he served
only four years. Volumes Thirty through Forty-One of the Cali-
fornia Reports ought to have a golden "0" on their spines, denot-
ing that they contain opinions by Otto.
I. OTro FOR THE COURT
Otto's lasting legacy is in those volumes, and that's what I
want to focus on in this remembrance. There are eighty-three
majority (or lead) opinions by Otto and forty-two dissents, plus
another forty-two concurring opinions.0 These opinions are so
readable that it seems almost perverse to write about them, instead
of just quoting Otto (as in fact I'll often be doing). Like the proud
proprietor of a great wine cellar, you're endlessly tempted to show
off and savor your favorites. At the same time, though, reading
Otto's opinions can almost make you cry, especially if you com-
pare them with many of the opinions produced by the California
Supreme Court today.
One obvious contrast is length. Otto's majority opinions for
the court (death penalty cases excluded) averaged about 4,300
words. This was twelve percent shorter than the majority opinions
produced by the other justices serving with Otto, and forty-five
7. Id. at 1183.
8. Id- at 1134.
9. Id. at 1188.
10. Opinions "concurring and dissenting" are counted as dissents.
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percent shorter than the majority opinions turned out by the court
today (death cases again excluded). One wonders how the present
court would defend this differential. Would anyone claim that the
opinions of today's court are better, in any way, than Otto's? If
Otto could decide a case in fewer than 5,000 words, why can't to-
day's justices (or their research attorneys)? "
Brevity is only one of the ways that Otto's opinions stand out;
another is that, while Otto surely used law clerks and research at-
torneys, you rarely have any doubt that the opinion was written, or
rewritten, by Otto himself. The laser-like analysis, the deep
learning and scholarship lightly wielded, the style, the wit, the pa-
nache are trademarked Otto. True, his majority opinions could be
all-business and impersonal, especially in criminal cases or in tasks
he did not relish, such as (one assumes) his role as the court's des-
ignated tort-killer in upholding the MICRA medical malpractice
"reform" legislation.12 But almost always there is some of Otto's
lightness, grace, and punch." Otto would make even the most dif-
ficult opinions look easy, dealing on terms of relaxed familiarity
with subjects such as common carrier liability insurance coverage
and zeroing in effortlessly (or so it seemed) on the heart of the
case.i" One audience that appeared to appreciate Otto's opinions
consisted of his fellow justices; in 1982, his first year, Otto led the
court by far in the percentage of his majority opinions that were
unanimous."
11. In a recent reply to my criticisms of the present court along this and other
lines, Chief Justice Ronald M. George has conspicuously avoided the subject of
opinion length. See Stephen R. Barnett, The Bureaucourt, CAL. LAW., Sept. 1996, at
27, 28; Ronald M. George, Letter to the Editor, The Justices Are In, CAL. LAW., Dec.
1996, at 13, 13-14.
12 See Fein v. Permanente Med. Group, 38 Cal. 3d 137, 695 P.2d 665, 211 Cal.
Rptr. 368 (1985); Roa v. Lodi Med. Group, 37 Cal. 3d 920, 695 P.2d 164, 211 Cal.
Rptr. 77 (1985); Barme v. Wood, 37 Cal. 3d 174, 689 P.2d 446, 207 Cal. Rptr. 816
(1984); American Bank & Trust Co. v. Community Hosp. of Los Gatos-Saratoga,
Inc., 36 Cal. 3d 359, 683 P.2d 670, 204 Cal. Rptr. 671 (1984).
13. See, e.g., People v. Castro, 38 Cal. 3d 301, 696 P.2d 111, 211 Cal. Rptr. 719
(1985) (holding that the "Victims' Bill of Rights" initiative did not put all prior con-
victions into evidence): "The People attempt to escape from this plainest of mean-
ings, by claiming-to put it bluntly-poor draftsmanship." Id. at 310, 696 P.2d at
116,211 Cal. Rptr. at 723.
14. See Home Indem. Co. v. King, 34 Cal. 3d 803, 670 P.2d 340, 195 Cal. Rptr.
686 (1983) (Kaus, J., for unanimous court).
15. See, e.g., Ramos v. Superior Court, 32 Cal. 3d 26, 648 P.2d 589, 184 Cal. Rptr.
622 (1982) (prosecution of special circumstance allegation barred after dismissal by
magistrate) (Kaus, J., for unanimous court).
16. Sixty-three percent of Otto's opinions for the court in 1982 were joined by all
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In reviewing Otto's record recently, one thing I found surpris-
ing was his performance in death penalty cases. Moderate as Otto
was in other areas, in death cases his liberal streak came through
loud and clear. He wrote for the court in eleven death penalty
cases, reversing the penalty in all eleven. 7 He voted in forty-six
death penalty cases, voting to reverse the penalty in forty-five of
them.' This is a record nuzzling the sixty-one-out-of-sixty-one
death penalty reversals that brought down Chief Justice Bird, and
Justices Reynoso and Grodin with her, in the 1986 election. 9
What to make of Otto's record in death penalty cases? That
batting average isn't easy to square with Otto's usual willingness to
set aside his policy preferences and apply the law, however dis-
tasteful. It indicates, though, how complex Otto was as a judge.
He had a deep passion for fairness and a sympathy for society's
underdogs that tended to prevail in criminal cases, along with a
moderation, common sense, and sure feeling for the limits of judi-
the other sitting justices, compared with 45% for the runner-up, Chief Justice Bird.
See Barnett, supra note 5, at 1183 n.346.
17. See People v. Leach, 41 Cal. 3d 92, 710 P.2d 893, 221 Cal. Rptr. 826 (1985);
People v. Silbertson, 41 Cal. 3d 296, 709 P.2d 1321, 221 Cal. Rptr. 152 (1985); People
v. Hamilton, 41 Cal. 3d 408, 710 P.2d 981, 221 Cal. Rptr. 902 (1985); People v. Mas-
sie, 40 Cal. 3d 620, 709 P.2d 1309, 221 Cal. Rptr. 140 (1985); People v. Frierson, 39
Cal. 3d 803, 705 P.2d 396, 218 Cal. Rptr. 73 (1985); People v. Holt, 37 Cal. 3d 436,
690 P.2d 1207, 208 Cal. Rptr. 547 (1984); People v. Turner, 37 Cal. 3d 302, 690 P.2d
669, 208 Cal. Rptr. 196 (1984); People v. Ramos, 37 Cal. 3d 136, 689 P.2d 430, 207
Cal. Rptr. 800 (1984); People v. Mroczko, 35 Cal. 3d 86, 672 P.2d 835, 197 Cal. Rptr.
52 (1983); People v. Easley, 34 Cal. 3d 858, 671 P.2d 813, 196 Cal. Rptr. 309 (1983);
People v. Robertson, 33 Cal. 3d 21,655 P.2d 279,188 Cal. Rptr. 77 (1982).
18. In addition to the cases cited supra note 17, see, for example, People v. Croy,
41 Cal. 3d 1, 710 P.2d 392,221 Cal. Rptr. 592 (1985); People v. Carlos, 35 Cal. 3d 131,
672 P.2d 862, 197 Cal. Rptr. 79 (1983); People v. Haskett, 30 Cal. 3d 841, 640 P.2d
776, 180 Cal. Rptr. 640 (1982). The only case in which Otto voted (with the court) to
affirm a death sentence was People v. Fields, 35 Cal. 3d 329, 673 P.2d 680, 197 Cal.
Rptr. 803 (1983).
19. Could it be, then, that Otto's premature departure from the court in 1985 was
due, in part, to a disinclination to heap the plate for his famous "crocodile in the
bathtub?" See JOSEPH R. GRODIN, IN PURSUIT OF JUSTICE: REFLECTIONS OF A
STATE SUPREME COURT JUSTICE 177 (1989) (quoting Otto as likening the effect of
judicial elections to "brushing your teeth in the bathroom and trying not to notice
the crocodile in the bathtub"). I do recall one evening, not long after the 1982 judi-
cial election, when Otto and I were having a drink in his Spanish hideaway and he
groused about the election results, in which Frank Richardson got a retention vote of
76.2% and Otto only 57.0%, followed by Allen Broussard with 56.2% and Cruz
Reynoso with 52.4%. Id. at 168. I tried to reassure Otto by arguing that the voters
hadn't had time to digest the differences among the new justices and that next time
they would do better. Otto was not reassured. But Otto would not have been on the
ballot in 1986-his term ran to 1990-so he could have stayed for at least another
four years without worrying about reptilian diets.
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cial power that marked his civil-case judging.
II. OTTO ON LAWYERS
Among Otto's opinions for the court in civil cases, a bunch of
my favorites could be collected under the title "Otto on Lawyers."
While Otto was savvy about countless things, from the earthy to
the academic, he seemed especially knowing about the ways of
lawyers. One sparkling result was Hartman v. Santamarina
Otto's opinion for a unanimous court in this case upheld the hoary
practice of avoiding mandatory dismissal under the "five-year
rule, 21 by impanelling a jury and then sending it home until the
lawyers and judge could get to the case.
Originally, Otto observed, the practice may have been "a
mere professional courtesy to comatose counsel," but today's
overcrowded dockets "often make it touch and go whether even
the most aggressive plaintiff can get to trial within five years."2 To
the defendant's claim that impanelling a jury only to send it home
was "a 'charade' which does little credit to the public image of the
courts," ' Otto replied with a keen-edged thumbnail history of le-
gal fictions. Quoting Marshall and Blackstone, he recalled the"symphony of fictions" by which the King's Bench transformed the
action of ejectment into a way of trying title, and then the"machinations" by which the King's Bench usurped civil jurisdic-
tion from the Common Pleas by pretending to jail the defendant.24
"The obvious parallel between a 'pretend' jailing to acquire juris-
diction and the 'pretend' picking of a jury to keep it effective,"
Otto concluded, "suggests that the jurors participated not in a cha-
rade but, rather, in a tableau in a centuries old pageant."21
Here you had the classic ingredients of a Kaus opinion: a
practiced feel for the needs and habits of today's trial courts, a deft
lesson in legal history, unanswerable argument, wry and witty
writing, and all compressed into just over five pages.
Otto's sympathy for human foibles did not extend to hapless
lawyering, as several counsel of that ilk had occasion to learn. In
20. 30 Cal. 3d 762, 639 P.2d 979, 180 Cal. Rptr. 337 (1982).
21. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 583(b) (West 1996).
22 Hartman, 30 Cal. 3d at 766, 639 P.2d at 981, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 339.
23. Id
24. Id. at 766 & n.4, 767 n.5, 639 P.2d at 981 & nn.4-5, 180 Cal. Rptr. 339 & nn.4-
5.
25. Id at 767, 639 P.2d at 981-82, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 339-40.
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Carroll v. Abbott Laboratories, for example, one of Otto's
"comatose counsel" sought relief from a dismissal order with a
claim of "excusable neglect," citing a line of cases that seemed to
establish, in Bernie Witkin's words as quoted by Otto, that "'the
more gross and inexcusable the neglect of the attorney, the more
certain is the party of getting relief."'' Nothing doing, said Otto
for the court (Bird, C.J., dissenting). The exception noted by
Witkin should be limited to cases where the attorney had deserted
the client ("de facto substituted himself out of the case").2
"Excusable neglect" should be narrowly applied, "lest negligent
attorneys find that the simplest way to gain the twin goals of rescu-
ing clients from defaults and themselves from malpractice liability,
is to rise to ever greater heights of incompetence and professional
irresponsibility while, nonetheless, maintaining a beatific attorney-
client relationship. "29 This one took six pages.
Another errant counsel wandered into Otto's ken in Aloy v.
Mash,30 the "serendipity" case. This was a legal malpractice suit in
which the defendant attorney, in representing the wife in her di-
vorce action in 1971, had failed to assert a community property in-
terest in her husband's vested military pension. Although the law
admittedly was unsettled at the time, the defendant had done little
research ("an incomplete reading of a single case") 31 and hadn't
considered the issues raised by the vesting of the pension or by
possible federal preemption. Ten years later, in -McCarty v.
McCarty,32 the United States Supreme Court held that federal law
did preempt the application of community property principles to
federal military pensions. The defendant thus argued, as Otto put
it, that "the claim which defendant negligently failed to assert in
1971 luckily turned out to be worthless in 1981-the serendipity de-
fense." 33
The dissenters bought it. Justice Reynoso (joined by Chief
26. 32 Cal. 3d 892, 654 P.2d 775,187 Cal. Rptr. 592 (1982).
27. Id at 895, 654 P.2d at 775, 187 Cal. Rptr. at 592 (citation omitted).
28. Id. at 900, 654 P.2d at 779, 187 Cal. Rptr. at 596.
29. Id. When Chief Justice Bird complained that the malpractice remedy was
slow and inadequate, Otto responded with a bit of real-world savvy: "Realistically,.
* the mere threat of malpractice liability brings another purse into the settlement
negotiations and may thus actually further a speedy disposition." Id. at 898 n.7, 654
P.2d at 778 n.7, 187 Cal. Rptr. at 595 n.7.
30. 38 Cal. 3d 413, 696 P.2d 656, 212 Cal. Rptr. 162 (1985).
31. Id at 419,696 P.2d at 660,212 Cal. Rptr. at 165.
32. 453 U.S. 210 (1981).
33. Aloy, 38 Cal. 3d at 421,696 P.2d at 661,212 Cal. Rptr. at 167.
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW
Justice Bird and a pro tern justice) knew of "no case which suggests
that an attorney whose advice is correct may be held liable for
malpractice." Such formalism was not for Otto. Asserting the
community property claim in 1971 could in fact have benefitted the
client, he noted,35 while McCarty had not been retroactively ap-
plied and had been largely overruled by an act of Congress. 6 "It
would be ironic," Otto concluded, "if the chief legacy of McCarty
were the immunization of legal malpractice by an attorney who
never even pondered the issues which fathered McCarty's brief
life.
37
Nothing was more characteristic of Otto's judging than this
rejection of abstract formalism in favor of the fact-based human
realities involved in the actual practice of law.38
III. OTro DISSENTING
On the whole, though-criminal cases aside-Otto was pri-
marily a dissenter on the Bird court. He was too good a lawyer,
too moderate, skeptical, trial court-smart and fact-conscious, to go
along with the salient civil decisions of that court's majority. At
the same time Otto did not share the conservative views of the
court's other dissenting conscience, the relentless Frank Richard-
son.3 1 So Otto's was a distinct voice in the ideological middle-but
not the voting middle-of the court.
No one could mistake a Kaus dissent for that of another judge.
They all have his conversational tone and down-to-earth, prag-
34. Id. at 422, 696 P.2d at 662,212 Cal. Rptr. at 168 (Reynoso, J., dissenting).
35. See id at 419-21, 696 P.2d at 660-61, 212 Cal. Rptr. at 166-67.
36. See id. at 422 n.7, 696 P.2d at 661 n.7, 212 Cal. Rptr. at 167 n.7.
37. Id. at 422, 696 P.2d at 662, 212 Cal. Rptr. at 168; see also Wilson v. Sunshine
Meat & Liquor Co., 34 Cal. 3d 554,562, 669 P.2d 9, 14, 194 Cal. Rptr. 773, 778 (1983)
(Otto, for majority, denying relief to party whose lawyers had shown "appalling ab-
sence of diligence" in failing to bring case to trial).
38. For another rejection of formalism, see Otto's concurrence in Spiritual Psy-
chic Science Church of Truth, Inc. v. City of Azusa, 39 Cal. 3d 501, 520, 703 P.2d
1119, 1130, 217 Cal. Rptr. 225, 236 (1985) (Kaus, J., concurring). While the majority
struck down an anti-fortunetelling ordinance as contrary to California's free speech
guarantee, Otto agreed that the ordinance was overbroad but was "more optimistic
than the majority" that an acceptable one could be drafted. Noting that the plaintiff"cites no case which elevates fortunetelling to the same free speech pedestal as does
the majority," Otto could not help feeling "that the core values of the First Amend-
ment have somehow become obliterated in the court's somewhat formalistic appli-
cation of precedent based on entirely different facts." Id. (Kaus, J., concurring).
39. Of 129 cases decided with opinion by the court in calendar year 1982, Rich-
ardson dissented in 36 (and concurred in 2), while Otto was next with 16 dissents
(and 10 concurrences). See Barnett, supra note 4, at 1138.
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matic approach. The Kaus dissents are amazingly concise-most
one or two pages, none more than eight.4 Therein lies a notable
point about the court's procedures. Many dissents in the Califor-
nia Supreme Court, in Otto's day as now, began life as draft major-
ity opinions, or "calendar memos," and got outvoted; they com-
monly bear the stigmata of this history not only in their excessive
length, but also in the structural apparatus of a majority opinion
("Introduction," "Statement of Facts," "Background," "Legal
Analysis," "Conclusion," etc.) that the author has not bothered to
dismantle. Otto's dissents are always free of such detritus; they
directly confront the majority opinion, as a dissent should. Given
his differences with the Bird court majority, Otto must have writ-
ten plenty of calendar memos that got outvoted; in fact he told me
about one.42 When that happened, however, Otto evidently recast
the memo completely as a dissent. One wonders why today's jus-
tices can't do that, though admittedly the "90-day rule"-which
wasn't enforced in Otto's day-probably makes it harder.43
40. The longest appears to be Fullerton Joint Union High School Dist. v. State
Bd. of Educ., 32 Cal. 3d 779, 808, 654 P.2d 168, 188, 187 Cal. Rptr. 398, 418 (1982)
(Kaus, J., concurring and dissenting) (seven and one-half pages).
41. See, e.g., Cowan v. Superior Court, 14 Cal. 4th 367,383, 926 P.2d 438,448,58
Cal. Rptr. 2d 458, 468 (1996) (Brown, J., concurring and dissenting); Brosnahan v.
Brown, 32 Cal. 3d 236,262,651 P.2d 274,290,186 Cal. Rptr. 30,46 (1982) (Bird, C.J.,
dissenting).
42. Otto told me that this was true of City of Long Beach v. Bozek, 31 Cal. 3d
527, 530, 645 P.2d 137, 138, 183 Cal. Rptr. 86, 87 (1982) (holding that "constitutional
principles and tort principles combine" to prohibit a city from suing for malicious
prosecution). I had mentioned something I had written about Bozek, and Otto ex-
claimed: "That was my case." Otto's dissent in Bozek is a bit longer than usual for
him-five pages-but framed entirely as a response to the majority, with no traces of
the calendar memo it apparently once was. See id. at 539, 645 P.2d at 143, 183 Cal.
Rptr. at 93. (Kaus, J., dissenting).
43. Under the California Constitution's 90-day rule, obeyed strictly by the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court since 1989, see 2 JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF CAL., 1989 ANNUAL
REPORT 19 (1989), a case must be decided within 90 days after it is "submitted" (i.e.,
argued). See CAL. CONST. art. VI, § 19. This would reduce the time for converting
an outvoted calendar memo into an authentic dissent. But since the court has re-
acted to the 90-day rule by changing its procedures so as to vote on a case before the
argument, and not to set the case for argument until "the 'majority' calendar memo-
randum has been approved by at least four justices" and "all concurring or dissenting
calendar memoranda have circulated," SUPREME COURT OF CAL., PRACrICES AND
PROCEDURES 23 (1990), it is not clear why the outvoted calendar memo cannot be
converted into a dissent before the argument. The reality may be-as the strange
term "dissenting calendar memoranda" suggests-that this does not happen because
the memo's author clings to the hope of regaining the majority as a result of the ar-
gument. One wonders, though, why an alternative, dissent-like version of the out-
voted memo cannot be prepared and circulated before the argument, for the
(substantial) chance that the votes will not change. Indeed, a true dissent might well
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 30:943
It was Otto's dissents, in which he spoke for himself, that best
assembled and showcased the strands in his judicial philosophy (at
least for civil cases). At the same time those dissents reflect, by
mirror image, an historical portrait of the Bird court's positions,
even as those positions are skewered by Otto's mind and pen.
A. Law and Policy
One strand in Otto's dissents was a dispassionate commitment
to apply the law, letting the policy chips fall where they might.
Thus in Isbister v. Boys' Club of Santa Cruz, Inc.4 where the ma-
jority applied the Unruh Civil Rights Act to bar a boys' club from
excluding girls, Otto was with the "conservatives." He did not see
why the club, in pursuit of its purpose of deterring juvenile delin-
quency, could not focus on boys.45 The "basic mistake" of the
majority, wrote Otto in his wryly critical vein, was that
it views the Club's policies as being pointed toward the
exclusion of girls. With that chip on the majority's shoul-
der, pejoratives come easily. If the court looked at the
Club's activities more benignly as providing a service for
boys-a service tailored to their needs-it would not find
it necessary to reach such a wondrous result.46
be more likely than a "dissenting calendar memorand[um]" to shake votes from the
existing majority.
44. 40 Cal. 3d 72,707 P.2d 212,219 Cal. Rptr. 150 (1985).
45. See id. at 99-100, 707 P.2d at 230-31, 219 Cal. Rptr. at 168-69 (Kaus, J., dis-
senting).
46. Id. at 101, 707 P.2d at 232, 219 Cal. Rptr. at 170 (Kaus, J., dissenting). Isbis-
ter, though a statutory case involving private entities, presents interesting parallels
with the recent decision of the United States Supreme Court in the Virginia Military
Institute case, based on the Equal Protection Clause and involving state-supported
institutions. See United States v. Virginia, 116 S. Ct. 2264 (1996). In both cases the
majority emphasized the "uniqueness" of the institution and the lack of any compa-
rable facility for women. Compare id. at 2287 ("an educational opportunity no other
Virginia institution provides," plus "unequaled" prestige) and id. at 2285 (absence of"any 'comparable single-gender women's institution"') and id. at 2276 n.7 ("[w]e ad-
dress specifically and only an educational opportunity recognized ... as 'unique"')
with Isbister, 40 Cal. 3d at 77, 707 P.2d at 215, 219 Cal. Rptr. at 153 ("The Club is
unique in northern Santa Cruz County .... No single program or facility open to
girls offers a similar range of activities at similar cost.").
The legal issues presented by the two cases, however, seem basically different. As
long as state-supported single-sex schools are not per se prohibited, the"uniqueness" of the institution may be essential to a denial of equal protection. But
if the Boys' Club of Santa Cruz is a "business establishment" under the Unruh Act
and is thus prohibited from excluding girls, no logical basis appears for retracting
that conclusion when there are one or more girls' clubs in town with comparable or
better facilities. Otto made just this point at the start of his Isbister dissent:
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But in Murphy v. E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc.,47 Otto was with
the "liberals." While the majority (with the 1986 election in view)
went through contortions to hold that a pharmacist in filling a pre-
scription was performing a service rather than making a sale, and
so was not strictly liable for a product defect, Otto saw no reason
why strict liability for retailers did not cover a retail pharmacist.'
Otto was equally uninterested in massaging the legislative ego.
In Strang v. Cabro19 the court's majority, in an access of self-
abnegation, gave an expansive reading to 1978 amendments abro-
gating some decisions by the court that had imposed civil liabilityr
for injuries resulting from the illegal sale of alcoholic beverages.
Although the legislature had failed to enact anything abrogating
liability for illegal sale to a nonintoxicated minor, the court held
that this must have been intended as well. Otto declined to join in
this politic bow:
Defendants' problem in this case is that there is no law on
the books which condones their conduct .... I find it
puzzling that notwithstanding this void the court feels
compelled to grant absolution by an unnecessarily gener-
ous interpretation of the Legislature's effort to turn the
clock back to a time when it was not running properly.
Notable here, in the final phrase, was Otto's candid willing-
ness to invoke policy considerations-in his case, mainly liberal
ones-when they figured legitimately in judicial decision-making.
He thought they did here, because the legislature had not acted.
In the MICRA cases, where the legislature had acted, Otto saw no
alternative but to uphold the statute.
Nor would Otto rewrite contract terms to obtain a preferred
I feel compelled to express puzzlement at the majority's repeated mention
of the fact that there is no comparable facility for girls in the Santa Cruz
area. If there were a Girls' Club in Santa Cruz, would the majority be sat-
isfied with "separate but equal" facilities? .... Unless the majority is pre-
pared to suggest that the existence of additional facilities might affect its
conclusions, I respectfully submit that the references to the Club's monop-
oly are of no legalsignificance.
Isbister, 40 Cal. 3d at 98-99, 707 P.2d at 230, 219 Cal. Rptr. at 168 (Kaus, J., dissent-
ing).
47. 40 Cal. 3d 672,710 P.2d 247,221 Cal. Rptr. 447 (1985).
48. Id. at 700,710 P.2d at 267,221 Cal. Rptr. at 467 (Kaus, J., dissenting).
49. 37 Cal. 3d 720, 691 P.2d 1013, 209 Cal. Rptr. 347 (1984).
50. See, e.g., Vesely v. Sager, 5 Cal. 3d 153, 486 P.2d 151, 95 Cal. Rptr. 623
(1971).
51. Strang, 37 Cal. 3d at 729, 691 P.2d at 1019, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 353 (Kaus, J., dis-
senting).
52. See cases cited supra note 12.
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result or avoid a seemingly harsh one. In Fahey v. Gledhill 3 the
contract between the plaintiff yacht owner and the defendant dry-
dock relieved the dock of liability for damage "from any cause
whatsoever, excepting only willful misconduct."54 The dock's con-
duct, while very negligent (dropping the boat while relaunching it),
was not claimed to be "willful misconduct." The court allowed li-
ability nonetheless, by reading the clause as not disclaiming liabil-
ity for negligence. "[A]ny cause whatsoever" covered only "the
scope of the loss," the court reasoned, and not clearly enough "the
physical or legal responsibility" for the loss.55
For Otto, the clause was plain enough. With his killer instinct
for the perfect quote, he invoked Holmes on "'the inability of the
17th century common law to understand or accept a pleading that
did not exclude every misinterpretation capable of occurring to an
intelligence fired with a desire to pervert."'56 The majority, said
Otto, was dissecting the clause "with the mind-set of a 17th century
pleader."'
Policy predilections clashed with law again in City of Los An-
geles v. Venice Peninsula Properties.8 The majority imposed a"public trust" on southern California tidelands originally ceded to
private parties by Mexico and then patented to their owners by the
U.S. government, notwithstanding the failure of the grants to re-
serve any public rights. Otherwise, said Justice Mosk for the ma-
jority, California would have a "Mason-Dixon coastline," with the
public trust doctrine applying in the north but not in the south.59
Otto found this concern "probably overstated," but in any event
thought such policy considerations could not override the"governing United States Supreme Court decisions" on the scope
of the federal rants.' The United States Supreme Court unani-
mously agreed.'
Otto's independence from the Bird court's majority-and
from the interests of Governor Jerry Brown, who had just
53. 33 Cal. 3d 884,663 P.2d 197, 191 Cal. Rptr. 639 (1983).
54. 1d at 886, 663 P.2d at 198, 191 Cal. Rptr. at 640.
55. Id at 894, 663 P.2d at 204, 191 Cal. Rptr. at 646.
56. Id. at 895, 663 P.2d at 204-05, 191 Cal. Rptr. at 647 (Kaus, J., dissenting)
(citation omitted).
57. Id., 663 P.2d at 205, 191 Cal. Rptr. at 647 (Kaus, J., dissenting).
58. 31 Cal. 3d 288, 644 P.2d 792, 182 Cal. Rptr. 599 (1982).
59. Id at 303, 644 P.2d at 800, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 607.
60. Id. at 317, 644 P.2d at 809, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 616.
61. See Summa Corp. v. California ex rel. State Lands Comm'n, 466 U.S. 198
(1984).
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(belatedly) appointed him-was established in Otto's very first
dissent, in what proved to be the crucial redistricting case of the
1980s, Assembly v. Deukmeian.62 The court held that a state legis-
lative redistricting plan passed by the Democratic legislature and
signed by Governor Brown, but stayed by a Republican-sponsored
referendum, should be used in the 1982 elections in place of the
pre-existing districts-with the result, ultimately, of preserving
Democratic control of the legislature for the decade. In a 4-3
vote (the swing vote provided by a pro tern justice appointed by
Chief Justice Bird), Otto joined Justices Richardson and Mosk in
dissent. Otto's own dissent captured in one calm paragraph the
two considerations that should have controlled the case: "simple
adherence to precedent"-the previous decade's decision in Legis-
lature v. Reinecke ("Reinecke I") -- and avoidance of the "greater
judicial intrusion" into the process of legislation and referendum
that the majority's approach entailed.6 Even in this first and mo-
mentous outing, Otto could not resist a wry footnote: "I pity the
1992 Supreme Court which will have to break the tie between
Reinecke I and Assembly v. Deukmejian."6'
B. Facts and Skepticism
Another strand in Otto's dissents was his pragmatic skepti-
cism, his focus on facts in preference to the abstract principles,
policy notions, and per se rules favored by the majority. A text-
62. 30 Cal. 3d 638,639 P.2d 939,180 Cal. Rptr. 297 (1982).
63. The new plan was defeated in the referendum, but a majority of the legisla-
tors elected under it were, predictably, Democrats. They proceeded to enact, and
Governor Brown on his last day in office proceeded to sign, a new districting plan.
This one protected enough seats of Republican incumbents to obtain the two-thirds
vote needed to bar a referendum. For a fuller account, see Stephen R. Barnett, Cali-
fornia Justice, 78 CAL. L. REv. 247,255 n.34 (1990) (book review).
64. 6 Cal. 3d 595,492 P.2d 385, 99 Cal. Rptr. 481 (1972).
65. Assembly, 30 Cal. 3d at 694, 639 P.2d at 973, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 331 (Kaus, J.,
concurring and dissenting).
66. Id. at 694 n.1, 639 P.2d at 973 n.1, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 331 n.1. Happily, that
didn't happen. The combination of a Democratic legislature and Republican gover-
nor produced a political stalemate, and hence legislative districts for the 1990s drawn
by special masters appointed by the supreme court. See Wilson v. Eu, 1 Cal. 4th 707,
823 P.2d 545,4 Cal. Rptr. 2d 379 (1992).
67. Justice John Paul Stevens of the United States Supreme Court has raised the
same flag, in criticizing the majority of that Court. In a 1984 address at Northwest-
ern University Law School, Justice Stevens said he was taught in law school
to be skeptical of black letter rules that are found in hornbooks as well as in
appellate court opinions. The inevitable gaps in the law are not filled by
simple, logical extrapolations from an accepted proposition, but rather from
concentration on the novel as well as familiar aspects of specific cases and
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book example was People v. Shirley.6 The majority there held
flatly and grandly, in a fifty-page 'opinion by Justice Mosk, that
"the testimony of a witness who has undergone hypnosis for the
purpose of restoring his memory of the events in issue is inadmis-
sible as to all matters relating to those events, from the time of the
hypnotic session forward."6 Otto's dissent clogged this pristine
abstraction with some pesky facts. He noted the varied contexts in
which hypnosis may take place (such as aiding a police artist to
sketch the suspect right after the crime);7 the unfaced question of
the decision's apparent retroactive effect ("rendering incompetent
virtually all witnesses who have been hypnotized at any time in the
past without regard to the circumstances of the hypnosis"); 7' and
the further unconsidered question of what ha 2pens when a defen-
dant who has been hypnotized wants to testify.
Three months later the majority opinion was modified to
leave the retroactivity question open,73 and also to recognize a
"necessary exception to avoid impairing the fundamental right of
an accused to testify in his own behalf."74  Otto proceeded to
skewer the latter abstraction. Even if the right to testify in one's
own defense was "fundamental," he said, there could be "no right
to offer testimony which suffers from all of the potential vices
which have triggered the majority's total ban on the testimony of
hypnotized witnesses."75 Meanwhile the legislature passed a stat-
ute that modified Shirley, by authorizing certain testimony by
previously-hypnotized witnesses under specified safeguards, 76 and
vindicated Otto's fact-conscious approach.
Another big idea of the Bird court was tort recovery for
controversies....
Annual Meeting of the American Bar Assoc., 53 U.S.L.W. 2082,2082 (Aug. 14, 1984).
68. 31 Cal. 3d 18, 723 P.2d 1354, 181 Cal. Rptr. 243 (1982), modifying 641 P.2d
775 (1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 860 (1983).
69. Id. at 66-67,723 P.2d at 1384, 181 Cal. Rptr. at 273.
70. Id. at 75,723 P.2d at 1389, 181 Cal. Rptr. at 278 (Kaus, J., concurring and dis-
senting).
71. Shirley, 641 P.2d at 811 (Kaus, J., concurring and dissenting), modified by 31
Cal. 3d 18,723 P.2d 1354, 181 Cal. Rptr. 243 (1982).
72. See id. at 811-12 (Kaus, J., concurring and dissenting).
73. See Shirley, 31 Cal. 3d at 67 n.53, 723 P.2d at 1384 n.53, 181 Cal. Rptr. at 273
n.53. The question subsequently was decided in favor of retroactivity in People v.
Guerra, 37 Cal. 3d 385, 690 P.2d 635, 208 Cal. Rptr. 162 (1984).
74. Shirley, 31 Cal. 3d at 67,723 P.2d at 1384, 181 Cal. Rptr. at 273.
75. Id. at 77,723 P.2d at 1390, 181 Cal. Rptr. at 279 (Kaus, J., concurring and dis-
senting).
76. See CAL. EVID. CODE § 795 (West 1995); see also Guerra, 37 Cal. 3d at 430
n.1, 690 P.2d at 665 n.1, 280 Cal. Rptr. at 192 n.1 (1984) (Kaus, J., concurring).
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breach of contract. Otto in a weak moment went along with this in
the misbegotten (and now overruled) Seaman's case.77 A year later
he was having second thoughts. Reflecting that "our experience in
Seaman's surely tells us that there are real problems in applying
the substitute remedy of a tort recovery-with or without punitive
damages-outside the insurance area," he lauded an article critical
of Seaman's and all but begged the legislature to step in.78 The
problem, he lamented, was that "there is tremendous pressure on
the courts, particularly this court, to extend bad faith liability to
other contractual relationships., 79 Otto continued:
So far we have not succumbed, although a satisfactory ra-
tionale for continued resistance is hard to come by. We
have learned how to spell "banana" but not how to stop.
Nevertheless, in my view it would be disastrous if every
contract were to be subjected to the same set of rules
which we have applied in the context of the insurer-
insured relationship. Without wishing to strike a blow for
bad faith or unfair dealing, I just cannot see every person
who wilfully breaks a contract subjected to almost unlim-
ited liability for punitive damages.
Here again, Otto had no compunctions about expressing his policy
preferences when they legitimately applied in a judicial context-
or in admitting that he had gotten them wrong the first time.
Another grand effort of the majority, cut down to size by
Otto's wry skepticism, came in a prison newspaper case, Bailey v.
Loggins. While the lead opinion trumpeted that a prison news-
77. Seaman's Direct Buying Serv., Inc. v. Standard Oil Co., 36 Cal. 3d 752, 686
P.2d 1158, 206 Cal. Rptr. 354 (1984), overruled by Freeman & Mills, Inc. v. Belcher
Oil Co., 11 Cal. 4th 85, 900 P.2d 669,44 Cal. Rptr. 2d 420 (1995).
78. White v. Western Title Ins. Co., 40 Cal. 3d 870, 901, 710 P.2d 309, 328, 221
Cal. Rptr. 509, 528 (1985) (Kaus, J., concurring and dissenting) (citing Michael
Traynor, Bad Faith Breach of a Commercial Contrac A Comment on the Seaman's
Case, 8 Bus. L. NEws 1 (1984)).
79. I at 900, 710 P.2d at 327,221 Cal. Rptr. at 527 (Kaus, J., concurring and dis-
senting).
80. Id. at 900-01, 710 P.2d at 327-28, 221 Cal. Rptr. at 527-28 (Kaus, J., concur-
ring and dissenting) (footnote omitted). Otto added one of his field notes on the
food-gathering habits of lawyers: "It seems to me that attorneys who handle policy
claims against insurance companies are no longer interested in collecting on those
claims, but spend their wits and energies trying to maneuver the insurers into com-
mitting acts which the insureds can later trot out as evidence of bad faith." ld. at 900
n.2, 710 P.2d at 328 n.2, 221 Cal. Rptr. at 528 n.2. (Kaus, J., concurring and dissent-
ing).
81. 32 Cal. 3d 907, 654 P.2d 758, 187 Cal. Rptr. 575 (1982).
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paper could enjoy First Amendment protection,2 Otto's three-
page dissent bristled with earth-bound facts. "The majority's con-
cept of the type of paper which defendants are to allow presuma-
bly conforms to some platonic ideal of a newspaper the very con-
templation of which evokes First Amendment magic," Otto
needled, but the newspaper in question was something else: "a
house organ, [permitted] as part of the inmates' educational and
vocational training program, run under the supervision of a civilian
instructor with full authority to select, edit and reject submis-
sions. " In "straining to find" that the newspaper was a "market-
place for ideas," Otto wrote, the majority
is not likely to further First Amendment values. It is rec-
ognized that the department is under no compulsion to
permit the publication of newspapers within our prisons.
It has, however, made a stab in that direction but, for its
pains, has been subjected to a rolling barrage of First
Amendment artillery. If the department can live with the
guidelines promulgated in this opinion.., no harm will be
done. On the other hand, if it finds the guidelines intoler-
able, it will simply have to discontinue a worthwhile edu-
cational and vocational training program.4
C. A Rare Passion
One concurring opinion showed a different face of Otto, the
passion for social justice that he usuall y kept contained. This was a
judicial discipline case, In re Stevens,' in which the court imposed
public censure on Judge Stevens for repeated use of racial and
ethnic epithets, mostly to counsel and court personnel while in
chambers. Justice Mosk filed a remarkable dissent, arguing that
the judge's speech was protected by the First Amendment. That
was too much for Otto. "In view of the dissent," he felt "compel-
led to detail some of the facts," and proceeded to spell out some of
the judge's remarks 6 (a demonstration Justice Mosk labeled
"gratuitously lurid")." "It is beyond me," Otto declared,
how it can be argued that such behavior is not "conduct
82. See id. at 917, 922-23, 654 P.2d at 764,768-69, 187 Cal. Rptr. at 581,585-86.
83. Id. at 929-30, 654 P.2d at 774, 187 Cal. Rptr. at 591 (Kaus, J., dissenting).
84. Id at 930-31, 654 P.2d at 774, 187 Cal. Rptr. at 591 (Kaus, J., dissenting).
85. 31 Cal. 3d 403, 645 P.2d 99,183 Cal. Rptr. 48 (1982).
86. Id. at 404-05, 645 P.2d at 99-100, 183 Cal. Rptr. at 48-49 (Kaus, J., concur-
ring).
87. Id at 405, 645 P.2d at 101, 183 Cal. Rptr. at 50 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
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prejudicial to the administration of justice" simply be-
cause Judge Stevens otherwise performed his judicial du-
ties "fairly and equitably." ... . The administration of
justice is prejudiced by the public perception of racial
bias, whether or not it is translated into the court's judg-
ments and orders.8
All the other justices, except Justice Mosk, joined in Otto's opin-
ion.89
IV. CONCLUSION
Although Otto Kaus was only one justice on a court of seven,
and was often outvoted to boot, in his four years on the California
Supreme Court he gave that court a professional stature it has not
had since. However the votes might fall, it was Otto's view of a
case that carried the most weight, I think, for the state's lawyers
and judges. Otto brought to the court a unique combination of
qualities-high intellectual capacity (so obvious it goes without
saying), learning and scholarship, common sense, skepticism, fidel-
ity to law, a passion for social justice tempered by a sense of judi-
cial limits, courtroom savvy and human sympathy, wit and literary
talent, lightness and grace, earthiness and sophistication-that
placed his opinions in a class of their own. California has never
had a better judge, nor a more estimable man on its bench. We
were fortunate to have him on the court for a brief shining mo-
ment, and can serve his memory best by studying and emulating
his judicial example. 90
88. Id. at 405, 645 P.2d at 100, 183 Cal. Rptr. at 49 (Kaus, J., concurring).
89. See id. (Kaus, J., concurring).
90. In these days of Mandatory Continuing Legal Education, one might wish that
supreme court justices and their judicial research attorneys were not exempt. An
M.C.L.E. program devoted to the opinions of Otto Kaus, with justices and research
attorneys required to attend, could do wonders for the opinions turned out by the
court today. Since Otto loved to ski, one could hold the program at Mammoth or
Squaw, with morning sessions devoted to Otto's opinions, skiing in the afternoon,
and after-ski drinks and stories about Otto in an atmosphere he would have loved.
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